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Bonyads: Economic Control of Iran Through Charity

By: Arya Darvish

Mar 17, 2025

How Bonyads Fit Into Iran’s Governing Structure


Bonyads: Economic Control of Iran Through Charity 

Introduction 

Bonyads, including the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, are charitable, tax-exempt para-governmental organizations in Iran. They control a significant portion of the country's economic assets and are closely linked to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Supreme Leader. These organizations were initially ordered to be established by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomheni in 1979 after the Iranian Revolution (5). The IRGC Cooperative Foundation, for instance, manages the IRGC's investments and control across various economic sectors in Iran and abroad (6). Currently, the United States has imposed financial sanctions against this bonyad and its leadership for their involvement in illegal activities and their role in funneling money to the IRGC and the Islamic Regime (9). Various sources estimate the scale of bonyads's control of the economy ranging from 20-50% (7). 


How Bonyads Fit Into Iran’s Governing Structure 

Iran’s government, while having a branch system similar to that of the United States, is constitutionally a theocratic republic. This endows immense power to the Supreme Leader, a Shiite Islamic Cleric. The Supreme Leader's appointment and veto power can shape Iranian governance (1). The current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has been in power since 1989 and previously served as the president from 1981 to 1989, highlighting the enduring influence of the Supreme Leader in Iranian politics. 

Legislative power is given to the Iranian Consultative Assembly, whose members are elected by the general public and are generally divided between reformists and conservatives. However, those who can become a member of the parliament must first be allowed to hold office by the Guardian Council. This Guardian Council comprises religious scholars appointed by the 


Supreme Leader and legal jurists nominated by the Head of the Judiciary, who the Supreme Leader also appoints. Ultimately, this oversight by the Guardian Council allows the Supreme Leader to indirectly control who is part of the parliament and what legislation they determine is by Sharia Law. There is a president who is granted power within the executive branch and is responsible for approving and enforcing passed legislation. However, his decisions also have to be approved by the Supreme Leader. The Supreme Leader also influences the judiciary, even if it is an independent branch, as the Supreme Leader appoints its leadership. 


While there are supposed checks against the Supreme Leader, these agencies are heavily under his supervision and have historically never opposed him. The Expediency Council, appointed by the Ayatollah, manages conflicts between government agencies. The Council of Experts, an elected body responsible for selecting the Supreme Leader and monitoring their activity, also has its members vetted by the Guardian Council (4). This governmental structure effectively ensures that power is concentrated in the hands of the Supreme Leader and a select few conservative Islamists, underscoring the lack of adequate checks against his authority. 


The Ayatollah isn't the only main power in Iran; the IRGC also has immense power, with its leader often being considered the second most powerful person in Iran with the caveat that they serve directly under the Supreme Leader. Initially, Ayatollah Khomeini established the organization. To protect the interests of the Iranian Revolution domestically and abroad. Serving primarily as a military force, the IRGC grew immensely in power and fame due to the Iran-Iraq war, where they were generally successful. Today, the IRGC is responsible for facilitating terror groups across the Middle East, controlling vast industries in Iran, and subjugating internal threats to the Islamic Regime’s status quo (11). 


With the power afforded to them, the IRGC and the clerics can use bonyads to funnel wealth to themselves without regulation from the other branches of government. Ultimately, the Supreme Leader, who has the indirect power to ensure the bonyads are regulated and working for the people, has no incentive to upset the status quo. The bonyads accumulate wealth and power for these individuals while remaining tax-exempt, causing little benefit for the people (6). 


Bonyads and Iran Today 

Economic conditions in Iran are poor. There is high youth unemployment, a weak currency, and a lack of international investment due to many factors, including the bonyads, corruption, sanctions, and inflation (8). For years, the United States has levied sanctions against Iranian institutions and officials for human rights abuses across the Middle East. These sanctions include targeting bonyads operated by religious or IRGC authorities, including the massive Bonyad Mostazafan, which has holdings across every critical Iranian industry (10). The bonyads' directive to funnel money to the Ayatollah, coupled with sanctions against them, ensures the 


bonyads are hindered from making significant positive impacts on the Iranian economy. The legal framework of Iran allows these bonyads to control immense wealth extraction from the country and its people; those with the power to reform these organizations are the very individuals reaping the benefits from them. There isn't a legal path within Iran to change the nature of these institutions so they can fit their original mandate of helping the poor and uplifting the nation. 



(1) “An Overview of the Iranian Legal System.” n.d.-a. GlobaLex | Foreign and International Law Research (blog). https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/iran_legal_system_research1.html

(2) “Insight Report: The Sources of Iran’s IRGC’s Financial Empire and Their Sustainability in the Medium to Long Term.” 2024. Default. October 9, 2024. https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-and-national-security-analysis/post/the-sources-of-iran-irgc-financial-empire-and-their-sustainability-in-the-medium-to-long-term 

(3) “Iran.” 2025. In The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/iran/#terrorism

(4) “Iran: Why the Supreme Leader Is Not All-Powerful – GIS Reports.” 2020. January 30, 2020. https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/iran-leader/

(5) “Iranian Para-Governmental Organizations (Bonyads).” n.d. Middle East Institute. https://www.mei.edu/publications/iranian-para-governmental-organizations-bonyads

(6) Qaed, Anas Al. 2023. “The Economic Empire of the Revolutionary Guards in Iran.” Gulf International Forum (blog). May 16, 2023. https://gulfif.org/the-economic-empire-of-the-revolutionary-guards-in-iran/

(7) Saeidi, Ali A. 2004. “The Accountability of Para-Governmental Organizations (Bonyads): The Case of Iranian Foundations.” Iranian Studies 37 (3): 479–98. 

(8) “What Are the Big Economic Challenges Facing the Government in Iran?” n.d. 


Economics Observatory (blog). 

https://www.economicsobservatory.com/what-are-the-big-economic-challenges-facing-th 

E-government-in-iran. 

(9) “Treasury Sanctions the IRGC Cooperative Foundation and Senior Iranian Officials 


Connected to Protest Suppression.” 2025. U.S. Department of the Treasury. 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1209

(10) “Treasury Targets Vast Supreme Leader Patronage Network and Iran’s Minister of 


Intelligence.” 2025. U.S. Department of the Treasury. 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1185

(11) “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards | Council on Foreign Relations.” n.d. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards

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